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ABSTRACT

1.

In this paper, we consider the challenge of preserving patient
privacy in the context of mobile healthcare and home-care
systems, that is, the use of mobile computing and communications technologies in the delivery of healthcare or the
provision of at-home medical care and assisted living. This
paper makes three primary contributions. First, we compare
existing privacy frameworks, identifying key differences and
shortcomings. Second, we identify a privacy framework for
mobile healthcare and home-care systems. Third, we extract a set of privacy properties intended for use by those
who design systems and applications for mobile healthcare
and home-care systems, linking them back to the privacy
principles. Finally, we list several important research questions that the community should address. We hope that
the privacy framework in this paper can help to guide the
researchers and developers in this community, and that the
privacy properties provide a concrete foundation for privacysensitive systems and applications for mobile healthcare and
home-care systems.

Healthcare information technology (IT) has huge potential to improve healthcare quality, improve efficiency, and
reduce cost, and is currently on the cusp of major innovations and widespread deployment in the US and elsewhere.
In this paper, we specifically examine the role of mobile
computing and communications technologies. Such mHealth
technology [25] appears promising in many ways: enabling
physicians to remotely monitor their patients’ health and
improve the quality of healthcare, enabling patients to manage their health more easily, enabling home-care providers
to provide better quality at-home medical care to elders and
reducing the cost of care by allowing patients to spend more
time out of the hospital. Furthermore, the UN Foundation
has recently formed the mHealth Alliance specifically to explore and promote the value of mobile computing technologies in improving healthcare in developing nations [35].
In mHealth, personal mobile devices (such as smart phones)
accompanied by wearable, portable, and even embeddable
sensors, will enable long-term continuous medical monitoring [5, 21, 36] for many purposes: for outpatients with
chronic medical conditions (such as diabetes), individuals
seeking to change behavior (such as losing weight), physicians needing to quantify and detect behavioral aberrations
for early diagnosis (such as depression), home-care providers
needing to track movements of elders under their care in order to respond quickly to emergencies (e.g., an elder may
have fallen down) or athletes wishing to monitor their condition and performance. In this paper, we use the term “Patient” to describe the subject of sensing in all such use cases.
We expect that tomorrow’s personal mobile devices will contain the technology and applications needed to process sensor data and enable their appropriate use. The resulting
data may be used directly by the Patient [1, 2, 37] or may
be shared with others: with a physician for treatment [33],
with an insurance company for coverage, with a home-care
provider for elder-care, with a scientist for research [12, 30],
with a coach for athletic training [4], or with family members and friends in social-networking communities targeted
towards health and wellness.
Although mHealth systems have huge potential to improve quality of healthcare and to improve quality of life,
they also generate new security and privacy issues [23]. The
technology goal should be to develop usable devices that respect patient privacy while also retaining the data quality
and accessibility required for the medical uses of the data.
In this paper, we focus on privacy; specifically, we wish to
give the patient control over the data that is collected and

Categories and Subject Descriptors
A.1 [General]: Introductory and Survey; J.3 [Computer
Applications]: Life and Medical Sciences—Medical Information Systems, Health; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]:
Public Policy Issues—Privacy

General Terms
Security, Legal Aspects, Human Factors

Keywords
privacy framework, medicine, electronic health record, home
healthcare, mobile healthcare, mhealth, e-health, HIPAA

Acknowledgements
Supported by Intel Corporation and by NSF Trustworthy
Computing award 0910842. Thanks also to the reviewers.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
SPIMACS’09, November 13, 2009, Chicago, Illinois, USA.
Copyright 2009 ACM 978-1-60558-790-5/09/11 ...$10.00.

INTRODUCTION

to whom it is disclosed, and enable the patient to recognize
that different situations may require different responses. Indeed, we note that control, not possession or ownership, is
fundamental to privacy. Privacy means that the patient retains some control even when the data is “owned” by another
party (as is common in medical records maintained by a hospital) and even after a copy of the data has been provided
to another party (as when billing records are shared with an
insurance company). Security issues generated by mHealth
systems are beyond the scope of this paper.
Although the term “mHealth” applies broadly to the use of
mobile technology in healthcare applications, we focus here
on patient-centered technology, as described in the examples
above. There are, of course, valuable uses of mobile technology in other aspects of healthcare delivery and management,
including personal digital assistants (and personal communication devices) used by clinicians, inventory-control systems
for medical equipment and consumables, and telemedicine
platforms for emergency response or remote rural healthcare. Although these mHealth applications also involve security and privacy issues, we do not address them here.
This paper makes four primary contributions. First, we
compare existing privacy frameworks, with an eye to mobile
healthcare and home-care systems (Section 3). Second, we
identify a conceptual privacy framework – a set of actionable privacy principles – for mHealth (Section 4). Third, we
extract a set of privacy properties intended for use by those
who design systems and applications for mobile healthcare
and home-care systems (Section 5), and demonstrate their
application to a case study. Finally, Section 7 lists several
key research questions for the community.

2.

BACKGROUND

Before we discuss the existing privacy frameworks, we define “privacy” in the context of healthcare, and we lay out
an abstract architecture for mHealth systems, to provide a
foundation for the discussion ahead.
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Figure 1: mHealth Reference Architecture

mation: in addition to collecting physiological data, many
mHealth applications will collect information about Patient
lifestyle and activities (such as food habits and diet details, location tracks, physical activity, or social interactions). Third, mHealth will enable a broad range of healthrelated applications: sharing data with your health provider,
as in a traditional doctor relationship, but also sharing data
with an insurance company (e.g., to confirm compliance with
a medicine regimen), with lifestyle coaches (e.g., diet advisers), with athletic coaches (e.g., sports teams or health-club
trainers), with a home-care provider (e.g., to care for an elderly person) or with family (e.g., to support a relative’s recovery from surgery). In such settings, privacy is a complex
issue: the Patient needs subtle control over the collection,
recording, dissemination, and access to their mHealth data.

Architectural model.
Privacy.
Given our focus on privacy, it is essential that we define
it clearly for the context of healthcare. Fortunately, others
have thought deeply about this issue; we adopt the definition
selected by the National Committee for Vital and Health
Statistics (NCVHS), a key advisory committee to the US
Department of Health and Human Services. “Health information privacy is an individual’s right to control the acquisition, uses, or disclosures of his or her identifiable health data.
Confidentiality, which is closely related, refers to the obligations of those who receive information to respect the privacy
interests of those to whom the data relate. Security is altogether different. It refers to physical, technological, or administrative safeguards or tools used to protect identifiable
health data from unwarranted access or disclosure” [11]. We
also follow NCVHS and define PHI as “personal health information” rather than “protected health information”, which is
a phrase that has specific meaning in a HIPAA context [10].
Clearly, privacy is important in any healthcare information system. What is different, or especially challenging
about mHealth privacy? First, mHealth allows for the collection of far more medical data about the Patient, as many
mHealth devices collect data continuously over extended periods of time. Second, mHealth allows much broader range
of health information to be collected, not just medical infor-

Figure 1 portrays a high-level view of the structure and
context of patient-centric mHealth deployments. We imagine an infrastructure in which each Patient carries a mobile
node (MN), which may be their mobile phone or other mobile Internet device (MID), and a personal collection of sensor nodes (SNs) that can measure data about their activity
(accelerometers, pedometers, GPS) or physiology (electrocardiograms, pulse oximeters, blood-glucose meters, weight
scales). These sensors may be carried by the patient [22],
worn by the patient [29], embedded in their living space [33],
or implanted in their body [13]. The sensors communicate
with the MN through a body-area network. The MN is
responsible for coordinating the sensors, collecting the sensor data, (optionally) aggregating or pre-processing the sensor data, and reporting the data to a health records system (HRS). The MN also serves as the Patient’s primary
interface to the HRS, with respect to managing the datacollection process and subsequent sharing of the data.
The health records system (HRS) may be a Personal Health
Record (PHR) or Electronic Health Record (EHR) system;
most of the mobile-centric research challenges will be the
same for both scenarios. We must also consider the likely
situation, over the next decade, in which a Patient must interact with multiple health-records systems from multiple
providers and built on different models.

The Consumers of these records, including doctors and
other clinical personnel, insurance companies and other billingrelated personnel, researchers and regulators, access the HRS
through some Client computer. The security issues on this
platform are largely out of scope of this paper, except in
cases where we seek end-to-end technical mechanisms to support the Patient’s privacy wishes.
Finally, these people and systems need a supportive ecosystem, a set of authorities and agencies that provide the regulatory, logistical, and technical foundation for the above relationships. We can identify at least five roles to be played
by some combination of public and private organizations:
• Policymakers establish laws, regulations, and standards regarding the protection of Patient privacy in
mHealth technology.
• Certification bodies attest to whether particular products and services meet the policies and standards.
• Manufacturers produce hardware and software products and services, such as the MNs, SNs, and HRS.
• Distribution & management services distribute the
hardware and software to Patients and Consumers,
and provide remote-management capabilities such as
secure, automatic software updates and remote deletion of data and keys on lost devices.
• Public-key infrastructure provides the key-distribution
and certificate authorities to support the crypto-systems
used for verification (e.g., to verify the signature of a
certification body regarding an SN calibration, or to
verify the public key of a management service).
We should take care not to expect that a top-down definition of, let alone deployment of, such an infrastructure is
possible. Any such system will necessarily be defined and
deployed by many organizations and agencies, over time [32].
In the above infrastructure we expect that the Patient
would use their personal device as an MN; although the use
of a such a device is expedient, because the patient already
owns such a device and wants to carry it for other purposes,
there are many risks: the sensor data may be intercepted
(impacting privacy), tampered with (leading to improper
care decisions), or blocked (leading to loss of critical information to researchers or care providers). Furthermore, MNs
or SNs may be lost or stolen, resulting in possible exposure
of any data or encryption keys they contain. All of these
risks can lead to dangerous consequences for the patient and
provider [20, 34].
Although any viable solution, and any real deployment,
will doubtless be more complex than implied by this figure,
this architecture provides a structural basis and terminology for our discussion of privacy frameworks and privacy
properties, below.

3.

CONCEPTUAL PRIVACY FRAMEWORKS

Given the above definition for health information privacy,
then, we define a conceptual privacy framework to be a coherent set of actionable principles to protect patients’ health
information privacy. When developing and deploying a healthcare information system, the system design should include
security and privacy properties that align with the principles
in the conceptual privacy framework.

Although major laws (notably HIPAA [14] and ARRA [9])
provide a legal foundation for healthcare privacy, at least in
the US, these laws provide few details. Thus, others have
set out to define conceptual privacy frameworks, privacy
principles, or best practices for privacy, in the healthcare
context. In this section, we summarize the frameworks proposed by the US Office of the National Coordinator (ONC),
the Health Privacy Project, the Markle Foundation, and the
Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology (CCHIT).

3.1

ONC National Framework (2008)

In December 2008 the Office of the National Coordinator
for Health Information Technology (in the US Department of
Health and Human Services) released an important report,
announcing its Nationwide Privacy and Security Framework
for Electronic Exchange of Individually Identifiable Health
Information [28]. This document, which we call the “ONC
Framework”, provides the newest and most authoritative privacy framework for healthcare released in the US, so we
present it first. We quote their eight principles as follows,
adding numbers for ease of reference within this document.
Their document includes additional explanatory detail that
we do not quote here.
ONC1. INDIVIDUAL ACCESS. Individuals should
be provided with a simple and timely means to
access and obtain their individually identifiable
health information in a readable form and format.
ONC2. CORRECTION. Individuals should be provided with a timely means to dispute the accuracy or integrity of their individually identifiable
health information, and to have erroneous information corrected or to have a dispute documented
if their requests are denied.
ONC3. OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY. There
should be openness and transparency about policies, procedures, and technologies that directly affect individuals and/or their individually identifiable health information.
ONC4. INDIVIDUAL CHOICE. Individuals should
be provided a reasonable opportunity and capability to make informed decisions about the collection, use, and disclosure of their individually
identifiable health information.
ONC5. COLLECTION, USE, AND DISCLOSURE
LIMITATION. Individually identifiable health
information should be collected, used, and/or disclosed only to the extent necessary to accomplish
a specified purpose(s) and never to discriminate
inappropriately.
ONC6. DATA QUALITY AND INTEGRITY. Persons and entities should take reasonable steps to
ensure that individually identifiable health information is complete, accurate, and up-to-date to
the extent necessary for the person’s or entity’s
intended purposes and has not been altered or
destroyed in an unauthorized manner.
ONC7. SAFEGUARDS. Individually identifiable health
information should be protected with reasonable

administrative, technical, and physical safeguards
to ensure its confidentiality, integrity, and availability and to prevent unauthorized or inappropriate access, use, or disclosure.
ONC8. ACCOUNTABILITY. These principles should
be implemented, and adherence assured, through
appropriate monitoring and other means and methods should be in place to report and mitigate nonadherence and breaches.
We next consider some important predecessors and inspirations for the ONC Framework, in chronological order.

3.2

HPP best principles (1999)

The Health Privacy Working Group, organized by the
Health Privacy Project, released a set of “best principles” for
health privacy in 1999 [15]. The document, which we call
the “HPP Framework”, notes that their “principles are intended to establish a comprehensive framework”. We quote
their 11 principles as follows; note that their report provides
additional depth beyond these high-level statements.
HPP1. For all uses and disclosures of health information,
health care organizations should remove personal
identifiers to the fullest extent possible, consistent
with maintaining the usefulness of the information.
HPP2. Privacy protections should follow the data.
HPP3. An individual should have the right to access his
or her own health information and the right to
supplement such information.
HPP4. Individuals should be given notice about the use
and disclosure of their health information and their
rights with regard to that information.
HPP5. Health care organizations should implement security safeguards for the storage, use, and disclosure
of health information.
HPP6. Personally identifiable health information should
not be disclosed without patient authorization,
except in limited circumstances. Health care organizations should provide patients with certain
choices about the use and disclosure of their health
information.
HPP7. Health care organizations should establish policies
and review procedures regarding the collection,
use, and disclosure of health information.
HPP8. Health care organizations should use an objective
and balanced process to review the use and disclosure of personally identifiable health information
for research.
HPP9. Health care organizations should not disclose personally identifiable health information to law enforcement officials, absent a compulsory legal process, such as a warrant or court order.
HPP10. Health privacy protections should be implemented
in such a way as to enhance existing laws prohibiting discrimination.

HPP11. Strong and effective remedies for violations of privacy protections should be established.
Many of these themes resonate in the ONC Framework,
but we want to call attention to HPP2 and its underlying
detail, which notes that “All recipients of health information
should be bound by all the protections and limitations attached to the data at the initial point of collection”. This
transitive application of privacy constraints does not explicitly appear in the ONC principles, but we believe it is an important feature and deserves its top-level appearance in the
HPP Framework. (This principle shows up again as BP6,
below.) We anticipate that there may interesting methods
for technological protection of PHI, wrapping any PHI with
privacy policies before sharing with a third party.

3.3

HPP best practices (2007)

The Health Privacy Project recently listed 10 “best practices” for employers who are developing personal health records
(PHR) [16]. We quote their list as follows, adding numbers
for reference.
BP1. Transparency and notice. Employers should
be transparent about their reasons for offering a
PHR to employees and all policies that apply to
the PHR. Employers should provide an Information Policy Statement or Notice that clearly lays
out the ways in which information in the PHR
will be used and safeguarded. Employers should
incorporate the Notice into their health benefit
programs, and should make it available in a layered format a short concise version to accompany
a more detailed one. Employees should be informed of any updates to the policy.
BP2. Education. Employees should be educated about
the benefits, functions, and content of the PHR.
Information about the PHR should be communicated in numerous ways to build both knowledge
and trust.
BP3. Employees can choose which content is included in the PHR. Employees should be able
to determine the content of the PHR, including
which providers and plans contribute to it. Employees should be able to annotate the records
submitted by others, as well as to enter their own
information, with employee-entered data marked
as such. The identification of sources of all personal health information in the PHR should be
readily apparent.
BP4. Employees control access to and use of the
PHR. A. Employees should control who is allowed to access their PHRs. Employers should not
access or use employees’ individually-identifiable
health information from the PHR. B. Employees should choose, without condition, whether to
grant access to personal health information within
their PHRs for any “secondary uses”. An audit
trail that shows who has accessed the PHR should
be easily available to employees.
BP5. Employees can designate proxies to act on
their behalf. Employees should determine who,

including family members and caregivers, should
have direct access to their PHRs on their behalf.
Where possible, employees should be able to grant
proxy access to full or partial information in their
PHRs, including access in emergency circumstances.
Employees should also have the ability to revoke
access privileges.
BP6. “Chain of trust”: Information policies extend to business partners. The information
policies and practices of employer-sponsored PHRs
should follow the data through chain of trust agreements that require business partners to adhere to
the employer’s applicable policies and practices.
BP7. Data security. Employers should provide a strong
level of security to safeguard the information in
the PHR systems. A robust authentication process for access to PHRs should be required, in
addition to an audit trail that shows who has accessed information and when.
BP8. Data management. Employers should ensure
that the PHR systems they provide have comprehensive data management strategies that protect
the integrity of the data and include data retention policies.
BP9. Enforcement and remedies. Employers should
establish oversight and accountability mechanisms
for adhering to their PHR policies and practices.
Employers should put into place a mechanism to
promptly notify employees of any inappropriate
access to or use of information contained in an employee’s PHR, identify the steps which have been
taken to address the inappropriate activity, and
make resources available to employees to assist
them in addressing the effects of the inappropriate activity.
BP10. Portability. Employers should offer PHRs that
are portable, to the extent feasible, allowing employees to maintain or move the PHR and/or the
data it contains even after employment or coverage ends or changes.
We note that the ONC Framework largely covers these
practices. There are some aspects specific to PHR systems,
such as Patient-entered data (BP3) and portability (BP10).
There are some aspects specific to employer-provided systems, such as Education (BP2). BP5 mentions the concept
of a “proxy”, which is not mentioned by any of the other
frameworks, except ONC4 (in the details). The “chain of
trust” concept (BP6) is more explicit than in any of the privacy frameworks, except the HPP’s own earlier framework
(see HPP2). There is explicit mention of the requirement to
notify the Patient of any inappropriate disclosure (BP9); the
ONC Framework only mentions such notice in its detailed
comments, and only as an example of a reaction and not as
a requirement. The Common Framework (below) mentions
a similar requirement in its detailed comments about CF7.

3.4

Markle: Common Framework (2008)

The Markle Foundation launched a project “Connecting
for Health”, which brought together a wide range of stakeholders in developing a “Common Framework”, a model for

healthcare information exchange [24]. The Common Framework (CF) describes both policy and technical principles for
healthcare information exchange, and provides concrete prototypes of each: everything from patient consent forms to
data-interchange formats and information architecture. The
Center for Democracy & Technology later endorsed the policy aspects of the Common Framework in their own policy
document [8]. We quote the top-level description of the CF
principles here.
CF1. Openness and transparency: Consumers should
be able to know what information has been collected about them, the purpose of its use, who
can access and use it, and where it resides. They
should also be informed about how they may obtain access to information collected about them
and how they may control who has access to it.
CF2. Purpose specification: The purposes for which
personal data are collected should be specified at
the time of collection, and the subsequent use
should be limited to those purposes, or others
that are specified on each occasion of change of
purpose.
CF3. Collection limitation and data minimization: Personal health information should only be
collected for specified purposes and should be obtained by lawful and fair means. The collection
and storage of personal health data should be limited to that information necessary to carry out
the specified purpose. Where possible, consumers
should have the knowledge of or provide consent
for collection of their personal health information.
CF4. Use limitation: Personal data should not be disclosed, made available, or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified.
CF5. Individual participation and control: Consumers should be able to control access to their
personal information. They should know who is
storing what information on them, and how that
information is being used. They should also be
able to review the way their information is being
used or stored.
CF6. Data quality and integrity: All personal data
collected should be relevant to the purposes for
which they are to be used and should be accurate,
complete, and up-to-date.
CF7. Security safeguards and controls: Reasonable safeguards should protect personal data against
such risks as loss or unauthorized access, use, destruction, modification, or disclosure.
CF8. Accountability and oversight: Entities in control of personal health information must be held
accountable for implementing these principles.
CF9. Remedies: Remedies must exist to address security breaches or privacy violations.
The ONC Framework covers all these principles. CF1 is
covered by ONC3 (Openness and transparency), and ONC1

(Individual access). CF2 is covered by ONC5 (Collection,
use, and disclosure notification) and ONC1. CF3 is covered
by ONC5 and ONC4 (Individual choice). CF4 is covered by
ONC5. CF5 is covered by ONC1 and ONC4. CF6 is covered by ONC6 (Data quality and integrity). CF7 is covered
by ONC7 (Safeguards). CF8 is covered by ONC8 (Accountability). CF9 is covered by ONC8 and ONC2 (Correction).
Furthermore, we see little in the ONC principles that is
not covered in the Common Framework, except that ONC1
provides more explicit statement that Patients should have
an easy method to obtain their PHI, ONC2 provides an
explicit statement that Patients should be able to correct
mistakes in their records, ONC3 explicitly states openness
about policies and technologies, and ONC4 emphasizes that
Patients should be able to make informed choices.
[As an aside, we note that it may be difficult to decide
how and whether to provide Patients with the capability to
edit, annotate, and delete PHI in their record. The right
policy depends on the type of record; a PHR, for example,
allows a Patient to upload their own PHI, may allow them to
annotate PHI give by a healthcare provider, and may allow
them to delete data they have entered or whole sections of
data (e.g., all the data from a given provider). An EHR,
however, forms part of the official records of a healthcare
organization and must necessarily be more strict. A Patient
might request annotations or even deletions; such changes
would be subject to provider approval and be marked as
Patient-initiated; ‘deleted’ data may be retained for recovery
under certain override conditions (such as an audit). The
“right” policies are a delicate balance of Patient rights, legal
limits, and provider operational necessities. In general, our
position is that providers should honor such requests unless
there is a good reason not to do so.]
In a few cases, the ONC framework allows more flexibility,
suggesting rather than requiring. For example, CF5 bluntly
states that “consumers should be able to control access to
their personal information”; ONC4 (individual choice) allows significant flexibility, only requiring that “individuals
should be provided a reasonable opportunity” for choice,
and (in the details) that “the degree of choice available may
vary. . . ”.
We believe that the Common Framework is a crisper statement of the important principles; it is also more explicit in
emphasizing that data should be used only for the purpose
for which it was collected, and that Patients should have
control over what is collected and to whom the data may be
disclosed.

3.5

CCHIT’s certification criteria (2008)

The Certification Commission for Healthcare Information
Technology (CCHIT) is a non-profit organization that certifies healthcare information systems, and they recently released their certification criteria for PHRs. Although it appears that they have a process in place to determine these
criteria, and that the process may enable and encourage updates to the criteria, we quote the current list of criteria as
published in a booklet copyrighted in 2008 [7].
CCHIT1. Consent. You should be in control of your personal health information and how it is used. PHRs
that meet certification requirements must include
safeguards that require you to give your explicit
consent before your account is opened, or allow
you to opt out of the service. It also must al-

low you to decide if your data can be collected,
displayed, accessed, stored, released or disclosed.
CCHIT2. Controlling Access to your Information. Your
PHR should give you the ability to decide what
information is private and to restrict access to it.
Your PHR provider must get your permission to
gather or disseminate any information about you.
You also decide who else can view information in
your PHR, and limit the types of information that
can be viewed.
CCHIT3. Conditions of Use. The conditions for using
your PHR should be explicitly explained to you,
and you have the right to challenge your PHR
provider if it does not comply with the conditions
of use. If conditions of use are changed, your PHR
provider is required to notify you of the changes.
CCHIT4. Amending the Record. You should have the
ability to change or request changes to your health
record via email or telephone, and the telephone
number of customer service must be posted on the
Web site of your PHR provider.
CCHIT5. Account Management. Your PHR provider
must have a way for you to terminate your account, if you wish, and to confirm that all your
personal data has been deleted from the system.
CCHIT6. Document Import. Your PHR system should
be able to retrieve health records, explicitly label
and manage your personal health information and
be able to distinguish between data entered by
you and data retrieved from other sources.
CCHIT7. Data Availability. Your system should allow
you to view or print your health information whenever you need it.
It is instructive to compare these criteria with the HPP
Best Practices for PHR systems, since both attempt to cover
the same ground. CCHIT1 (consent) is covered by BP3
(choose which content), BP4 (control access), and BP1 (transparency). CCHIT2 (control) is similar to BP4 (control).
CCHIT3 (conditions of use) is similar to BP1 (transparency
and notice). CCHIT4 (amending) is mentioned by BP3, although BP3 calls it “annotating” rather than “amending”,
which in some contexts may be an important difference.
CCHIT5 (the ability to delete your account) is not covered by any HPP Best Practice, which is an interesting
omission. CCHIT6 (document import) is about capability (ability to import documents) and about distinguishing
user-entered data from provider data (which is mentioned
by BP3). CCHIT7 (availability) is not covered by any HPP
Best Practice, even BP8 (data management).
There are many of HPP’s Best Practices that do not appear in the CCHIT criteria. In particular, BP1 is more specific than CCHIT3 about the presentation and quality of the
terms and notification, BP2 (education of the user) is not
covered, BP3 is more clear that sources of data should be
clearly identified, BP4 precludes employer use of employee
PHR data, BP4 requires an audit trail and that the audit trail be easily available, BP5 allows the designation of
proxies, BP6 requires the “chain of trust” in which privacy

policies follow the data to other business partners, BP7 requires strong mechanisms for security, access control, and
access logs, BP8 requires data-integrity policies and mechanisms, BP9 requires notice and assistance in the event of
a data breach, and BP10 requires PHR portability to new
employers. None of these aspects – many of which we believe are important properties – are covered by the CCHIT
criteria, leading us to the opinion that the CCHIT Criteria
are too weak and should be strengthened.
Similarly, the CCHIT criteria fall short of the ONC framework. ON3 (openness and transparency) is covered somewhat by CCHIT3 (conditions of use), but not the requirement (stated in the details) for access to an audit log. ONC4
(individual choice) says (in the details) that a Patient should
be able to designate a proxy, which is not mentioned in the
Criteria. ONC5 (collection, use, and disclosure) limits the
collection, use, and disclosure of PHI to the minimum necessary for a particular purpose and the Criteria have no such
concept; of course, a PHR is intended to collect PHI more
widely than an EHR, at the discretion of the Patient, but
this concept should still apply to the disclosure and use of
PHR information. ONC6 (data quality and integrity) states
the obligation of providers to ensure records are complete
and correct; no such requirement appears in the Criteria.
ONC7 (safeguards) describes security and data-integrity requirements, which do not appear in the Criteria. Although
CCHIT1 says the Patient should be able to challenge the
PHR provider if they do not follow their terms of use, the
Criteria have nothing like ONC8 (accountability) that requires the PHR provider to have mechanisms for monitoring internal compliance, and for notifying Patients if there
is a data breach. Again, it is our opinion that the CCHIT
Criteria are too weak and should be strengthened.

3.6

Others

We have insufficient space here to describe in depth all of
the relevant privacy frameworks.
We note with interest an earlier, detailed survey of privacy
principles for healthcare, by Buckovich et al. [6]. Although
interesting, this 1998 survey pre-dates all of the documents
we survey here, even pre-dating HIPAA.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data [27] is an old list
of eight principles that, although not specific to healthcare,
has inspired all of the above frameworks.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) published
a privacy framework, a set of “information privacy principles”, in 2005 [3]. This framework is not specific to healthcare, and is meant more generally for the commercial use
of personal information. One analyst, however, shows that
there are too few details – and far too much flexibility – in
the APEC Framework for it to be useful [31].
The International Security, Trust, and Privacy Alliance
conducted a 2007 analysis and comparison of several important privacy frameworks from around the world [18]. The
committee that developed the ONC Framework considered
this document in their work. Although not specific to healthcare, this document is helpful because it brings a broad, international perspective to privacy frameworks, and attempts
to provide uniform definitions for common terms. Although
their final list of definitions are not a set of principles, implicit in these terms are the core concepts of many privacy

principles. These definitions build on their earlier work, a
Privacy Framework [17], although that document is mostly
focused on an architecture for “services and capabilities” in
handling personal information throughout its life cycle. It
does little, specifically, to generate a precise set of principles.
The Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST) released a security framework for healthcare in March 2009,
but it is available only to member organizations and only for
a fee [19]. Little information is available about this framework and it is not clear whether it includes a comprehensive
set of privacy principles.

4.

AN MHEALTH PRIVACY FRAMEWORK

So, after reviewing all those conceptual privacy frameworks, which one do we recommend as the basis for research and development in mHealth systems? Both the ONC
Framework and the Common Framework (CF) are appealing, because both are recent (2008), both are fairly complete,
and both were developed by diverse groups of experts and
stakeholders. We chose to use the Common Framework for
four main reasons.
First, the CF more clearly states the fundamental privacy principles for healthcare information systems. The
ONC Framework leaves many important issues to the details, rather than expressing them in the main bullets. Indeed, the ONC Framework leaves certain issues implicit.
When privacy is at stake, it is important to be explicit. Second, the ONC Framework is less concrete, leaving flexibility
on several principles. We believe it is important to state the
core principles, clearly and simply, and to aim implementations at them. Third, the CF has a more Patient-centric
viewpoint. Finally, concrete materials accompany the CF
principles: everything from patient consent forms to datainterchange formats and information architecture.
We restate CF principles for completeness.
CF1. Openness and transparency
CF2. Purpose specification
CF3. Collection limitation and data minimization
CF4. Use limitation
CF5. Individual participation and control
CF6. Data quality and integrity
CF7. Security safeguards and controls
CF8. Accountability and oversight
CF9. Remedies
We cannot resist the temptation to incorporate a few important principles best described by other frameworks:
• From BP3: Patients “should be able to annotate the
records submitted by others, as well as to enter their
own information, with employee-entered data marked
as such.”
• From BP5: Patients “can designate proxies to act on
their behalf. [Patients] should determine who, including family members and caregivers, should have direct

access to their PHRs on their behalf. Where possible,
[Patients] should be able to grant proxy access to full or
partial information in their PHRs, including access in
emergency circumstances. [Patients] should also have
the ability to revoke access privileges.”
• From BP6: “The information policies and practices. . .
should follow the data through chain of trust agreements that require business partners to adhere to the. . .
applicable policies and practices.”

P2. Enable patients to review storage and use of their PHI
(CF5)

• From ONC1: Patients should have an easy method to
obtain their PHI in a readable electronic format.

a. Review historical records of all information in property P1.

• From ONC2: Patients should be able to correct mistakes in their records.

P3. Enable patients to control, through informed consent
(CF1, CF3, CF5, ONC4, BP5),

• From ONC3: The system should be open about the
policies and technologies in use.

a. What PHI will be collected and stored, and in what
contexts
b. When PHI will be collected and stored (allowing patients to stop and restart data collection)
c. Who will have access to their PHI (including Patient
proxies), and in what context
d. How their PHI may be used, and in what circumstances

• From ONC4: Patients should be able to make informed
choices about what data is collected, how it is used,
and to whom it is disclosed.
• New: the presence of medical sensing devices, or of
sensor-data collection, should not be observable by
nearby parties (this privacy threat is unique to mHealth).
In summary, there are several existing conceptual privacy
frameworks. Each has been developed by experts in the
field, usually by large bodies of diverse stakeholders who
have worked for months or years to examine relevant laws,
documents, and current practices. Many of the above frameworks have been developed after studying the others, and
thus there is a significant degree of overlap. On the other
hand, there is a surprising degree of difference in the principles, and some frameworks have notable omissions. There is
fairly broad agreement about general principles, but there
is room for reasonable disagreement about the details, in
part because there are difficult trade-offs between protecting privacy and providing efficient, effective healthcare. The
NCVHS discussed several of these issues in 2006 [11], and
revisited some of them in 2008 [26]. We chose the Common Framework (CF) as our own working framework for
the purpose of research and development, albeit with some
appendages drawn from some of the other frameworks.
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d. Who has access to their PHI, and under what circumstances
e. When PHI collection purpose (why) changes or access
(who) changes
f. How their PHI is used
g. About risks of data collection or disclosure
h. About security breaches or PHI misuse

PRIVACY PROPERTIES

A high-quality mHealth system should protect privacy
and data integrity, remain available, and be auditable. We
derive the following properties from the above privacy principles (as specified in parentheses below), and add the necessary integrity, availability, and auditability properties. (See
Table 1 to cross-reference with the above frameworks.) Finally, we list the functional properties for completeness.

Security and privacy properties.
A high-quality mHealth system should:
P1. Inform patients (CF1, CF2, ONC1, ONC4)
a. What PHI is collected and stored
b. Why PHI is collected and stored
c. Where PHI is stored and at which organization

P4a. Enable patients to access their PHI (CF1, ONC1, BP3).
P4b. Honor patients’ requests to add, annotate, correct and
delete their PHI (CF6, ONC2, BP3), where possible.
P5. Provide easy-to-use interfaces for all of the above, including clearly defined terms and a layered presentation that allows interested users to dig into the details.
P6. Limit collection and storage of PHI (CF3)
a. As needed for specified purpose
b. Per limitations of patient consent
c. Using lawful and fair means
P7. Limit use and disclosure of PHI to those purposes previously specified and consented (CF4, CF7)
a. Policies should follow PHI as it flows to other entities
(BP6)
P8. Ensure quality of PHI (CF6)
a. Ensure data freshness and accuracy when collected
b. Ensure data integrity and completeness during transmission, processing, and storage
c. Ensure authenticity of patient providing input or wearing sensor
d. Ensure authenticity and quality of sensors
P9. Hide patient identity, sensor presence and data-collection
activity from unauthorized observers
P10. Support accountability through robust mechanisms (CF8)
a. Include audit logs for all access, addition, deletion, and
modification of PHI (the MN, too, should log its actions with respect to collection, upload, and access to
PHI, and pairing with SNs and other devices)
P11. Support mechanisms to remedy effects of security breaches
or privacy violations (CF9)

Table 1: Comparison of our security and privacy properties with other major frameworks; a framework item
is mentioned if it covers some, though not necessarily all, of our property.
ONC
HPP
BP
CF
CCHIT
Property
P1
Inform patients
ONC1,3,4
HPP4,6
BP1
CF1, CF2 CCHIT3
P2
Review storage and use
ONC1
HPP3
CF5
P3
Informed consent
ONC4
HPP4,6
BP5
CF1, CF3 CCHIT1,3
P4
Access, annotate, correct
ONC1, ONC2 HPP3
BP3
CF1, CF6 CCHIT4,5,6,7
P5
Usable interfaces
other frameworks do not emphasize usability
HPP6
BP3
CF3
CCHIT2
P6
Limit collection and storage ONC5
P7
Limit to specified purposes
ONC5
HPP2
BP4, BP6 CF4, CF7
P8
Ensure quality
ONC6, ONC7
BP7, BP8 CF6, CF7
this property is specific to mHealth
P9
Hide from observers
P10 Accountability
ONC8
BP4
CF8
P11 Remedies
BP9
CF9
not related to privacy
HPP1,8,9,10 BP2,BP10

Functional properties.
A high-quality mHealth system should be:
P12. Flexible, supporting multiple types of data
a. Streaming data, i.e., high-frequency, periodic data
b. Event data, i.e., low-frequency aperiodic data
c. Patient-entered data, using one or more modes of input
P13. Scalable, to large numbers of participants (Patients
and Consumers) and devices (MNs, SNs)
P14. Efficient, particularly regarding resources on MN and
SN (CPU, memory, bandwidth, energy)
P15. Usable
a. Patient: physical usability of sensors, i.e., preserve
wearable-ness
b. Patient and provider: easy interfaces for data collection and access
c. Physically challenged Patients: accessible interfaces
for informed consent and control over PHI
P16. Manageable
a. Ensure remote configurability and calibration of system components
b. Ensure ability to remotely manage lifecycle of software
and credentials in system despite having no control
over OS and firmware updates of system machinery
c. Enable easy provisioning and de-provisioning of health
applications, tools and data
P17. Available, preventing loss of (or loss of access to) PHI
a. At MN, data latency and risk of loss must balance
against resource limitations
We recognize that there are many subtle and in many instances, challenging, aspects to supporting these properties
in an mHealth system, and that many of these properties
are not unique to mHealth. Some of these properties will
require support on the SN and MN; others may be achieved
only in the back-end servers (HRS) or the data consumer’s
system (Client). Careful study is needed, in the context of a
system design, to identify which properties will need support
on the mobile platform. For example, the interface designed

to ensure property P1 on a mobile node must be highly userfriendly because of the limited viewing area on its screen; the
interface may have to be multi-modal to convey information
effectively to the patient. As another example, because mobile nodes are highly vulnerable to physical loss or theft,
they must be remotely manageable; i.e., an administrative
entity must be able to disable or lock the mobile node remotely and prevent patient data from being stolen.

6.

CASE STUDY

Here we illustrate how some of the aforesaid properties
can be realized in a “privacy aware” mHealth system.
Ravi is a diabetic who finds it difficult to manage his
condition effectively, resulting in significant variation of his
diurnal blood-glucose levels, and frequently elevated blood
pressure and cholesterol levels. Ravi’s doctor advises him
to subscribe to a Diabetes Management Program offered by
his hospital. As part of the program, Ravi wears a hospitalprovided device that continuously monitors his activity level
and calories burned. The device is designed as a wrist watch
to improve usability and to prevent anyone in Ravi’s vicinity from detecting that he is wearing it (P9-hide sensor
presence). Upon first use, the device records features of
Ravi’s pulse waveform (plethysmograph). Whenever Ravi
takes the device off his wrist and wears it again, the device
uses the plethysmograph as a biometric to authenticate him.
As long as Ravi wears the device, it monitors his activity and
wirelessly sends encrypted data to his smartphone.
Also as part of the program, Ravi’s smartphone is provisioned with certified software and a set of cryptographic
keys. Upon installation and setup, the software on the
smartphone uses one or more of the keys to authenticate the
wrist device. The software further verifies that the device is
properly calibrated and un-tampered, thereby ensuring data
quality and integrity (P8-ensure quality of PHI). The
software processes data it receives from the device and acquires other contextual information such as Ravi’s location
(using GPS or Wi-Fi localization), ambient audio (using a
microphone), calendar schedule and time of the day. This
data is used to infer social context (such as whether Ravi is
at home or at the office, in conversation or alone). The software reminds Ravi to take his medication, alerts him to long
periods of inactivity, encourages him to log diet information
and tracks his daily goals of calorie intake and expenditure.
The phone synchronizes data with Ravi’s PHR server.

Figure 2: Screenshot of example policy

Before starting data collection, the smartphone application presents Ravi with a privacy policy; one screen of a
sample policy is shown in Figure 2. Ravi observes that the
privacy policy is easy to understand, clear and concise (P5easy to use interfaces), unlike verbose privacy policies on
some health websites. The privacy policy clearly conveys
(P1-inform patients) information about the collection,
use, and storage of Ravi’s Personally Identifiable Information (PII, a super-set of PHI).
After disclosing information about what PII will be collected and why, who has access to the PII and how it will be
used, the software seeks Ravi’s consent to begin using the
system (P3-informed consent). Specifically, the software
presents Ravi options in the form of check boxes that allow
him to control data collection and dissemination. It allows
Ravi to control data collection by enabling him to specify
times of the day during which data can be collected – by
turning ON/OFF location sensing, audio sensing, and medical sensing (P3-enable patient to control data collection and dissemination). It also allows Ravi to control
data dissemination by specifying who (people, roles, or organizations) has access to his PHI and at what level of detail.
Ravi allows detailed access to his PHI (including context)
to his doctor and spouse, allows the insurance company access to his aggregate health trends, and allows researchers
access to anonymized aggregate data only. Ravi also names
his spouse as a “proxy”, allowing her to act on his behalf and
with all privileges equivalent to his. These steps are completed in the hospital under the supervision of an expert
who can answer Ravi’s questions about the privacy issues
and policy interface, but Ravi can revisit this interface and
change his preferences at any time.

An embedded accelerometer in the wrist device monitors
Ravi’s activity in terms on number of walking steps, and an
optical sensor monitors his pulse rate (which is used to estimate exercise intensity). The system is able to accommodate
real-time streaming data, periodic and aperiodic sampling of
location information, audio and schedule; it also allows Ravi
to manually enter diet information (P12- flexible). A fusion algorithm on the smartphone estimates Ravi’s context,
which serves both to augment the medical data in the PHR
and more immediately to provide customized and relevant
reminders, tips, and motivational messages that encourage
him to increase physical activity and control his diet. For
example, when the smartphone determines that Ravi is running late for a meeting, it avoids prompting him to take the
stairs instead of the elevator. Or, when the system determines that Ravi is in conversation, it avoids using spoken
motivational messages.
Using authentication keys retrieved from a secure internal
storage area, the smartphone periodically connects with the
backend server to upload his activity, diet and context information, and to obtain messages for Ravi that arise from
either automated or human analysis of his data. Ravi also
receives a username and password for a secure web interface
accessible from any computer (P4-enable patients to access, add and annotate their PHI). The web interface
presents detailed charts and trends of his health parameters,
activity, diet information and established context, which
help him to review, introspect and improve his lifestyle. Per
Ravi’s privacy choices, the same information is available to
his spouse and doctor for review. However, the insurance
company may only access high-level information about his
fitness level. This is sufficient for the insurance company as
Ravi’s insurance premium depends on his fitness level.
Whenever Ravi is wearing the wrist device, he can seamlessly use his smartphone to view the backend-stored PII.
When the wrist device is not present, or cannot biometrically verify Ravi as its wearer, the smartphone will only
provide access to PII after entry of the password. This approach provides ease of use in the common case but prevents
misuse in the case of device loss or device theft.
The backend server maintains audit logs (P10-support
accountability) of all accesses, additions, and updates to
Ravi’s PII. With his password, Ravi can review at any time
who has accessed which parts of his PII and when. The
system also has mechanisms to send an alert SMS to Ravi’s
smartphone in case there is an unauthorized access to Ravi’s
PII or if there is a security breach.
Periodically, Ravi’s smartphone receives mHealth software
updates, because the software comes with a maintenance
contract. Security-related patches are automatically installed,
and new features are optionally installed. This remote manageability (P16-manageable) protects Ravi’s PII and keeps
Ravi’s interest with the addition of novel features.
After one month, Ravi’s smartphone is stolen while he is at
the gym. With one call to his cellular carrier, his old phone is
remotely disabled (destroying all the keys and PII stored on
the phone) and a new phone is sent by courier. Fortunately,
Ravi’s service contract (with the mHealth software provider)
also supports him in the case of a lost device, so the new
phone arrives pre-configured with the necessary software and
encryption keys, and automatically recognizes the sensors
Ravi had paired with his earlier phone.

7.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In this section, we highlight some of the key research problems that must be solved to realize an mHealth system that
possesses the properties described in Section 5.
1. Consent Management: How can patients use their
mobile node (MN) to easily manage consent, i.e., express preferences over collection, dissemination and retention of PHI, and make consent decisions when requests occur? Usable and accessible interfaces are key.
2. MN Architecture: How should MN hardware and
software architecture change to help protect patient
privacy and enable them to manage privacy? For example, what hardware and software enhancements would
help enforce patient privacy preferences? In what way
are these enhancements different from those required
to support other functional and security properties?
3. Enforcing control over data: How can patient privacy policies be securely bound to personal health information (PHI) and enforced on PHI data (for example, auto-destruct data after a specified time limit,
limit the number of views, limit the number of copies,
or identify the entity responsible for copying data)?
4. Data identity: How can patient data be labeled such
that consumers of that data (e.g., doctors) can verify the assertion that this data belong to this patient,
without compromising patient privacy?
5. Anonymization: What are effective algorithms to
anonymize PII before disclosing it to another party,
e.g., for research or for a medical opinion?
6. Accountability: What mechanisms can be used to
support accountability (i.e., make consumers of PHI
accountable to the patient for using PHI according to
her preferences) and non-repudiation?
7. Ecosystem: What are the ecosystem support roles
in an mHealth system? We have initially identified
five roles (Figure 1); policy makers, certification bodies, manufacturers, distribution & management, and
a public-key infrastructure. What policy and legal
frameworks need to be in place for them to serve these
roles?
8. Tradeoffs: Solutions to the problems above involve
many tradeoffs, such as between anonymity and accountability, or patient authenticity and privacy. An
important research challenge, then, is to develop a
conceptual working framework to help identify these
tradeoffs within a solution space and choose an appropriate balance when making design decisions.

8.

SUMMARY

This paper makes four primary contributions. First, we
compare existing privacy frameworks, with an eye to mobile
healthcare and home-care systems. We quote or paraphrase
the top-level principles given in each framework, then compare and contrast the frameworks, identifying key differences
and shortcomings. Second, we identify a privacy framework
for such systems, using the Common Framework as a core
and drawing a few principles from other frameworks. No

one framework captured all of the privacy principles we believe should be followed. Third, we extract a set of privacy
properties intended for use by those who design systems and
applications for mobile healthcare and home-care systems,
linking them back to the privacy principles. Finally, we list
several important research questions that the community
should address.
We hope that the privacy framework in this paper can
help to guide the researchers and developers in this community, and that the privacy properties provide a concrete
foundation for privacy-sensitive systems and applications for
mobile healthcare and home-care systems. There remain
many technical challenges to realize these properties, given
the constraints of mobile systems and the need to present
usable interfaces on tiny devices to patients and providers
(many of whom have limited technology background).
In mobile healthcare and home-care systems, the potential is great, the opportunities endless, and the challenges
exciting. Let’s all be sure that patient privacy remains one
of the core requirements.
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